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ABOLITION OF THE MENTAL ILLNESS DEFENSE
STEPHEN C. RATHKEt
Criminal intent or mens rea is an essential element of most crimes. Yet
even ifan accused intended the consequences of his criminal act, he will be
acquitted if he successfilly invokes the insanty defense. In this Article,
Mr. Rathke argues that the insanity defense has become obsolete. Is the
defense really needed when the accused acted intentionally but failed to
appreciate the wrongful nature of his act due to mental illness or defi-
ciency? Should the consequences of conviction rule the determination of
guilt? After surveying the various modifications the insanity defense has
suffered to appease its critics, Mr. Rathke concludes that the defense is too
infirm to save and that the interests of the community and criminal defend-
ants will efectively and constitutionally be served by abolition of the in-
sanity defense. f
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f After this Article had gone to the printer the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
a defendant had a constitutional right to assert insanity as a defense to criminal charges,
State v. Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1982), but that the defendant had no right to
present psychiatric testimony on the issue of intent. State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703
(Minn. 1982). The validity of Mr. Rathke's analysis and criticism is not diminished by
these decisions. Mr. Rathke's discussion accommodates the concerns raised in these deci-
sions by advocating the elimination of the bifurcated trial and the legislatively declared
admissibility of psychiatric expert testimony on the issue of intent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to present an argument for elimi-
nating the defenses of mental illness and mental deficiency from
Minnesota criminal law. A thoughtful person's first impression of
this proposal might well be negative. If a fundamental purpose of
criminal law is to visit society's retribution upon those who disobey
predefined rules, then how can society punish those who, because
of a mental disorder, cannot appreciate the law's command? After
all, a "basic postulate of our criminal law is a free agent con-
fronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and
choosing freely to do wrong."' Although it might be difficult to
locate a single human embodiment of this prototypical criminal,
his theoretical existence makes us all feel more comfortable about
building new jails and prisons to accommodate him. Those suffer-
ing from mental disorders-the mentally ill, the insane, the re-
tarded-do not conform to this free-agent criminal prototype and,
so the argument goes, must be dealt with outside the criminal jus-
tice system.
Excluding a segment of the population from the "benefits" of
the criminal justice system by labeling them "mentally ill" is a
mistake. If a person, while possessing the state of mind requisite to
acknowledge his conduct as criminal, commits an act that the law
defines as antisocial, that person is blameworthy. The factor in
that person's make-up which motivated him to intentionally com-
mit a prohibited act may be of concern to sociologists, psychia-
trists, and psychologists, and may even merit mention in a
presentence investigation report. It should not, however, excuse
1. State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17, 32, 199 N.W.2d 774, 783 (1972). The supreme
court makes this statement no less than four times in its opinion. Id at 32, 37, 42, 43, 199
N.W.2d at 783, 785, 788. The court was quoting 21 AM. JUR. 2d, Cnrninal Law § 48
(1967), which was quoting Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1952),
which was in turn quoting Pound, Introduction to F. SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW
xxxvi-xxxvii (1927).
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that person from the societal blame proclaimed in the guilty
verdict.
Abolition of the insanity defense has the advantages of affording
greater protection to society,2 fairer treatment to mentally ill per-
sons,3 and increased effectiveness in the administration of justice.
4
Although this assertion will be analyzed within the context of
Minnesota law, the arguments contained herein apply with equal
force in other jurisdictions.
II. MENTAL ILLNESS-MINNESOTA'S APPROACH
A. Historical Development
Minnesota is more traditional in its approach to the defenses of
mental illness and mental deficiency than most states. 5  In 1865
the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the M'Naghten6 test with
respect to insanity.7 The court's decision was codified in 1885.8
The statute in its present form states as follows:
No person shall be tried, sentenced, or punished for any crime
while mentally ill or mentally deficient, so as to be incapable of
understanding the proceedings or making a defense; but he
shall not be excused from criminal liability except upon proof
that at the time of committing the alleged criminal act he was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from one of these causes,
as not to know the nature of his act, or that it was wrong.9
The legislature replaced the words "idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or
insanity" with "mentally ill or mentally deficient" in 1971.10
Until 1954 virtually all jurisdictions followed the M'Naghten
2. See infra notes 98-118 and accompanying text.
3. See infia notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
4. See in7fa notes 135-55 and accompanying text.
5. For a recent comparison of the approach of the 50 states and the federal system,
see Note, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Alternative, 8 WM. MITCHELL L.REv. 233 (1982).
6. The MfNaghten standard, adopted in England in 1843, states that to establish a
defense of insanity the defendant must prove that
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.
Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
7. State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341, 13 Gil. 315 (1868), afd, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 35 (1869);
State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 10 Gil. 178 (1865).
8. Penal Code of the State of Minnesota § 19 (1886).
9. MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (1980).
10. Act of May 17, 1971, ch. 352, § 1, 1971 Minn. Laws 603.
1982]
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rule."I In that year the Court of Appeals of the District of Colum-
bia determined in Durham v. United States '2 that "an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect.' 3 The decision so moved Dr.
Karl Menninger that he described it as "more revolutionary in its
total effect than the Supreme Court decision regarding segrega-
tion."' 4 The writer, Chief Judge David Bazelon, was rewarded
with the Isaac Ray Award, the highest honor bestowed by the
American Psychiatric Association, in 1961. Policymakers, how-
ever, were less impressed; only Maine felt free to follow Durham. 15
By 1972 even Judge Bazelon declared the Durham experiment a
failure, and it was overruled.' 6 A different standard proposed by
the American Law Institute (ALI) has met with greater success.
The ALI test provides for the insanity defense if the accused "as a
result of mental disease or defect . . . lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.' 7 This test
has been adopted by a substantial number of states and federal
circuits, by either statute or court decision.' 8
All this activity was duly noted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. Feeling left out of the reform movement but reluctant to
overturn legislated policy, the court complained in 1967 that the
A'Waghlen test "should have been discarded with the horse and
buggy."1 9 The court urged the legislature to repeal Minnesota
11. A notable exception, New Hampshire provides for a defense of insanity if the
criminal conduct is "the offspring or product of mental disease." State v. Pike, 49 N.H.
399, 402 (1869). No jurisdiction followed New Hampshire until the 1954 District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals decision in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.
1954).
12. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
13. Id at 874-75.
14. Quoted in R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 80 (1973). The original state-
ment appeared in Bazelon, The Awesome Deczsion, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan. 23,
1960, at 32,.54.
15. See State v. Hathaway, 161 Me. 255, 211 A.2d 558 (1965). The Hathaway decision
was incorporated into the Maine Criminal Code. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 58
(Supp. 1980). Maine has since adopted the American Law Institute (ALI) test. ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 38, 39 (Supp. 1981)former/, at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 102
(1964).
16. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
18. For a list of jurisdictions, see People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149
Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978), wherein the California Supreme Court overturned M'ANaghten in
favor of the ALI test.
19. State v. Dhaemers, 276 Minn. 332, 339, 150 N.W.2d 61, 66 (1967).
[Vol. 8
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Statutes section 611.026 "so that the courts could develop rules for
determining mental competency more in harmony with advances
made in this scientific field since the announcement of the
M'Naghten rule in 1843."2 0 Five years later the court made a com-
prehensive analysis of the insanity defense in Minnesota. At that
time State v. Rawland2  appeared to amend the legislatively
mandated M'Naghten rule of section 611.026. The court stated
that "the statute, strictly and literally construed, may be subject to
constitutional objections. '22 Rawland "saved" the statute by re-
quiring that evidence "be received freely so that the factfinder can
. ..take account of the entire man and his mind as a whole."
'23
The court stated that "the factfinder may give credence to compe-
tent evidence that relates to cognition, volition, and capacity to
control behavior. '24  M'ANaghten critics, however, were disap-
pointed when the court subsequently disavowed any intent to
amend the standard. In State v. Wendler 25 the court emphasized
that Rawland concerned itself only with the admissibility of evi-
dence.26 More recently, the court upheld the refusal of a trial judge
to give a jury instruction on the capacity to control behavior.2 7
The court has restricted its consideration of the defendant's knowl-
edge of the "nature of the act" to his perception of its physical
nature and consequences. 28 In determining whether the defendant
knew "that it was wrong," the court has defined the question in
moral rather than legal terms.2 9
Thus, Minnesota has taken the more traditional approach to the
mental illness defense. The doctrine of "irresistible impulse"-a
M'Naghten modifier-has been expressly rejected.30  By statute3'
20. Id
21. 294 Minn. 17, 199 N.W.2d 774 (1972).
22. Id. at 38, 199 N.W.2d at 786.
23. Id at 46, 199 N.W.2d at 790.
24. Id.
25. 312 Minn. 432, 252 N.W.2d 266 (1977).
26. See id at 434, 252 N.W.2d at 267-68.
27. State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Minn. 1979).
28. In State v. Wendler, 312 Minn. 432, 252 N.W.2d 266 (1977), the defendant killed
his sister by shooting her in the back of the head. The trial court found that defendant
knew the weapon was a gun, that the victim was his sister, and that if he shot her she
would die. Id. at 436, 252 N.W.2d at 268.
29. State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 336, 246 N.W.2d 48, 52 (1976).
30. See State v. Eubanks, 277 Minn. 257, 152 N.W.2d 453 (1967); State v. Finn, 257
Minn. 138, 100 N.W.2d 508 (1960); State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 262 N.W. 638
(1935). The dubious doctrine of "irresistible impulse" exonerates a person who passes the
M'Naghten test but "his will ... has been otherwise than voluntarily so completely de-
19821
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and by court decision, 32 a Minnesota defendant has the burden of
proving that he was so mentally ill or defective that he merits an
acquittal.
33
B. Current Procedures
Other procedural aspects of the mental illness defense are gov-
erned by Rule 20 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. 34
Rule 20.01 provides for a mental examination to determine if the
defendant is competent to stand trial. 35 If the trial court orders an
examination pursuant to both Rules 20.01 and 20.02, the examin-
ing agency studies the defendant's competence to stand trial and
whether the defendant has a valid mental illness defense. Refer-
rals can be made either to the Security Hospital at St. Peter, the
stroyed that his actions are not subject to it, but are beyond his control." Davis v. United
States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897).
31. MINN. STAT. § 611.025 (1980) provides that "a person is presumed to be responsi-
ble for his acts and the burden of rebutting such presumption is upon him."
32. Se, e.g., State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 246 N.W.2d 48 (1976); State v. Mytych, 292
Minn. 248, 194 N.W.2d 276 (1972); State v. Hoskins, 292 Minn. 111, 193 N.W.2d 802
(1972).
33. This placement of the burden of proof is undoubtedly constitutional. In Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the Court upheld a statute requiring the defendant to
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Any fear that Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975), overruled Leland was put to rest by Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977), where the Court refused to require the state to disprove an affirmative defense
beyond a reasonable doubt. For a comparison of the approach of the various states, see
Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 146 (1968).
34. The rules were promulgated pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 480.059 (1980) and went
into effect on July 1, 1975.
35. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01 states in part:
Subd. 1. Competency to Proceed Defined. No person shall be tried or sen-
tenced for any offense while mentally ill or mentally deficient so as to be incapa-
ble of understanding the proceedings or participating in his defense.
Subd. 2. Proceedings. If during the pending proceedings, the court in
which a criminal case is pending determines upon motion of the prosecuting
attorney, defense counsel, or on its own motion that there is reason to doubt the
defendant's competency as defined by this rule, the court shall proceed as fol-
lows:
(3) Medica/Exambiaion. The court shall appoint at least one qualified psy-
chiatrist or clinical psychologist or physician experienced in the field of mental
illness to examine the defendant and to report to the court on his mental condi-
tion. The court may order the defendant confined in a state mental hospital or
other suitable hospital or facility for the purpose of such examination for a speci-
fied period not to exceed 60 days. If the defendant or prosecution has retained a
qualified psychiatrist or clinical psychologist or physician experienced in the
field of mental illness, the court on request of the defendant or prosecuting attor-
ney shall direct that such psychiatrist or psychologist or physician be permitted
to observe the examination and to conduct his own examination of the
defendant.
[Vol. 8
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regional institution which accepts nondangerous patients, an out-
patient clinic or any private or federal hospital which will accept
the defendant. The defendant may opt for a bifurcated trial pur-
suant to Rule 20.02, subdivision 6(2).36 Through that procedure,
the defendant can prohibit the admission of evidence, obtained
through the 20.01 and 20.02 examinations, from the "guilt" phase
of the trial. During that first phase, the jury must determine
whether the prosecution has proved the essential elements of the
offense. The trial court may not instruct the jury on the conse-
quences of its verdict.
37
Until 1968, if a person was found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, the trial court possessed authority to commit the defendant
to a facility for the criminally insane for an indefinite period. Bol-
ton v. Harrs38 cast constitutional doubt upon that procedure. Nev-
ertheless, this process went unchanged in Minnesota until the
supreme court promulgated the Rules of Criminal Procedure in
1975.39 Rule 20.02, subdivision 8, now gives the trial court author-
ity to "cause" civil commitment proceedings to commence and
permits the defendant, in spite of the not guilty verdict, to be de-
tained pending the commitment proceedings.4 The decision to
institute civil commitment proceedings, however, rests with the
36. MINN. R. GRIM. P. 20.02(6) provides:
(2) Defendant's Election. If a defendant notifies the prosecuting attorney
under Rule 9.02, subd. 1(3) (a) of his intention to rely on the defense of mental
illness or mental deficiency together with a defense of not guilty, or if the defend-
ant in a misdemeanor case pleads both not guilty and not guilty by reason of
mental illness or mental deficiency the defendant shall elect:
(1) Whether there shall be a separation of the two defenses with a
sequential order of proof before the court or jury in a continuous trial in
which the defense of not guilty shall be heard and determined first, and
then the defense of the defendant's mental illness or deficiency; or
(2) Whether the two defenses shall be tried and submitted together to
the court or jury.
In felony and gross misdemeanor cases, the defendant's election shall be made at
the Omnibus Hearing under Rule 11. In misdemeanor cases, the defendant's
election shall be made at the pretrial conference under Rule 12 if held and other-
wise shall be made immediately prior to trial.
37. State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 246 N.W.2d 48 (1976).
38. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The court held that such mandatory commitment
was violative of the fourteenth amendment. See id at 650-53.
39. MINN. STAT. § 631.19 (1978) governed past procedure and provided authority for
the trial court to "forthwith, commit such person to the proper state hospital for safekeep-
ing and treatment." If the defendant had "homicidal tendencies," the commitment was to
the security hospital. The statute was suspended by Rule 20 in 1975. The legislature
repealed section 631.19 in 1979. See Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 233, § 42, 1979 Minn. Laws
485.
40. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02(8) provides that "[w]hen a defendant is found not guilty
by reason of mental illness. . .[but is] not under [civil] commitment, the court shall cause
19821
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county attorney not with the court.4' The county attorney, after
unsuccessfully attempting to convince a jury of the defendant's
sanity, suddenly may find himself in county court advocating the
former defendant's commitment as mentally ill and perhaps dan-
gerous. Because the vast majority of insanity defenses are raised in
felony cases, the court having jurisdiction over the civil commit-
ment proceedings is altogether different. 42 The general rules of ev-
idence govern civil commitment procedures. 43  The former
defendant is free to deny his or her participation in the act which
gave rise to the original trial, putting the authorities to the burden
of proof. Nothing exists to differentiate commitment proceedings
of those acquitted by reason of mental illness from any other com-
mitment proceedings. 4
4
As of August 1, 1982, under Minnesota's new civil commitment
statute, only if a person is committed as mentally ill and dangerous
must he undergo special review for discharge from commitment. 45
Persons under a general -commitment as mentally ill may be- re-
civil commitment proceedings to be instituted against him and that the defendant be
detained in a state hospital or other facility pending completion of the proceedings."
41. The court that heard the criminal case may petition for commitment, see Minne-
sota Commitment Act of 1982, ch. 581, § 7, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1286, 1293 (West)
(to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 253B.07(l)(f)), but the county attorney has discretion to
decide whether to pursue commitment proceedings beyond the pre-petition screening. See
id § 7, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. at 1293 (to be codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.01(I)(c), (d)). MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(15) (1980) used to provide explicit author-
ity for the county attorney to represent the petitioner. As a practical matter, petitions for
civil commitment, which are similar to criminal complaints, are prepared and issued at
the discretion of the county attorney.
42. Jurisdiction for civil commitment proceedings rests in the probate court. See Min-
nesota Commitment Act of 1982, ch. 598, § 7, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1286, 1293 (to
be codified at MINN. STAT. § 253B.07(2)). The new Minnesota Commitment Act, which
became effective August 1, 1982, did not alter jurisdiction for civil commitment. Compare
id with MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(l) (1980). In all but Hennepin and Ramsey counties,
probate court is a division of county court. See id. §§ 487.01(1), 525.011(1). In those two
counties, probate court is a division of district court.
43. See Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982, ch. 581, § 8, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
1286, 1296 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 253B.08(7)). Formerly MINN. STAT.
§ 253A.07(17) (1980) required similar compliance with the rules of evidence.
44. See Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982, ch. 581, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
1286 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 253B.01-.23). Neither did the former law
make any differentiation in the commitment proceedings. See MINN. STAT. § 253A.07
(1980).
45. See Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982, ch. 581, § 18, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law
Serv. 1286, 1304 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 253B. 18). Minnesota law used to pro-
vide for special procedures regarding the discharge from commitment of those acquitted of
criminal charges by reason of mental illness. See MINN. STAT. § 253A. 15(l) (1980).
[Vol. 8
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leased at any time by hospital authorities.46 The original trial
court, however, retains jurisdiction of those found not guilty by
reason of mental illness.47 After the trial court is notified by hospi-
tal authorities of any proposed discharge, it must hold a hearing to
determine if the defendant is still mentally ill or dangerous. The
rules specify no burden or standard of proof.48 Because the civil
commitment procedure for those found not guilty by reason of
mental illness is entirely de novo, a person acquitted of criminal
responsibility on the basis of insanity later can be found not in
need of civil commitment.
C Criminal Intent
The concept of criminal intent or mens rea has an important
but often neglected place in a discussion of the relationship be-
tween crime and mental illness. Virtually all crimes in Minnesota
of any consequence require some form of criminal intent. One is
not criminally responsible for breaking another's window or arm
unless one has the intent to do so. A more specific intent is re-
quired for crimes such as burglary (entry with intent to steal) or
murder (intent to kill).4 9 Criminal intent is defined by statute:
(1) When criminal intent is an element of a crime in this
chapter, such intent is indicated by the term "intentionally,"
the phrase "with intent to," the phrase "with intent that," or
some form of verbs "know" or "believe."
(2) "Know" requires only that the actor believes that the
specified fact exists.
(3) "Intentionally" means that the actor either has a pur-
pose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that
his act, if successful, will cause that result. In addition, except
as provided in clause (6), the actor must have knowledge of
those facts which are necessary to make his conduct criminal
and which are set forth after the word "intentionally."
(4) "With intent to" or "with intent that" means that the
actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result
46. See Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982, ch. 581, § 16, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law
Serv. 1286, 1302 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 253B. 16).
47. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. § 20.02, subd. 8(4).
48. The supreme court has cautioned, however, that the trial court is "not at liberty
to substitute its nonprofessional prognosis for that of the medically trained witnesses who
were of a different view." Warner v. State, 309 Minn. 333, 339, 244 N.W.2d 640, 644
(1976) (citing State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17, 40, 199 N.W.2d 774, 787 (1972)).
49. MINN. STAT. §§ 609.185, 609.19, 609.58 (1980).
1982]
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specified or believes that his act, if successful, will cause that
result.
(5) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of
the existence or constitutionality of the statute under which he
is prosecuted or the scope of meaning of the terms used in that
statute.
(6) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of
the age of a minor even though age is a material element in the
crime in question.
50
When instructing juries, the trial courts generally read only the
pertinent portions of this statute.
Because criminal intent usually is an essential element of the
offense charged, the question of whether evidence of mental illness
is admissible to negate the criminal intent necessarily arises. Vol-
untary intoxication has long been recognized as a factor for the
jury to consider with respect to criminal intent. 5' The State Model
Jury Instruction Guide provides the following charge:
It is not a defense to a crime that defendant was intoxicated at
the time of his act if he voluntarily became intoxicated. But
where, as in this case, it is an element of a crime that defendant
have had a particular intent, you should consider whether the
defendant was intoxicated, and if so, whether the defendant
was capable of forming the required intent. The State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the re-
quired intent.
52
If voluntary intoxication can negate criminal intent, by which
logic can a trial court prohibit evidence that the defendant's inten-
tion is befuddled by mental illness? No Minnesota appellate court
has spoken on this issue, and the Model Criminal Jury Instruction
Guide is likewise silent.53 A surprising number of courts in other
states have excluded evidence of mental illness bearing on the issue
of intent-stating, in effect, that insanity is either a complete de-
50. Id § 609.02(9).
51. Id § 609.075:
An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal
by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a neces-
sary element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of intoxication may be
taken into consideration in determining such intent or state of mind.
52. See 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE JIG, 7.03 (1977).
53. At least one commentator, however, has stated that because Minnesota has no
"diminished capacity" statute, "criminal responsibility is an all-or-nothing proposition."
MINNESOTA COUNTY ATTORNEYS COUNCIL, MEETING THE DEFENSE: INSANITY 10
(1978).
[Vol. 8
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fense or none at all. 5a These decisions are unsound. In a case of
murder in the first degree, the specific intent to kill is an essential
element of the offense which must be proved by the government
beyond a reasonable doubt.55 If this intent is not proved, the de-
fendant nonetheless may be found guilty of unintentional murder
or manslaughter. 56 If a defendant may present evidence that ex-
cessive drinking, injestion of controlled substances, stupidity, or
bad luck negated his intent, how can a trial court deny him the
opportunity to demonstrate that his mental illness had a similar
effect? 57 If evidence negating intent were excluded and the de-
fendant convicted of a crime that required the state to prove a
specific criminal intent, the supreme court would have to reverse
because the trial court precluded the defendant from offering rele-
vant evidence negating an essential element of the offense.
Admitting evidence of a mental disorder to show a lack of in-
tent, of course, plays havoc with the bifurcation procedures of
Rule 20. During the "guilt" phase of a murder trial, the defendant
could elicit psychiatric testimony that related to his inability to
form the specific intent to kill. If the prosecution could not prove
this specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant
would be entitled to a verdict of guilty to a lesser degree of homi-
cide. The testimony in the second phase of the trial would, to a
great extent, repeat that of the first. The defendant could call the
same psychiatrists to elicit virtually the same evidence in an effort
54. See, e.g., State v. Janovic, 101 Ariz. 203, 417 P.2d 527 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1036 (1967); State v. Jones, 359 So. 2d 95 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049 (1978). Cases
are collected at Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968).
55. MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (Supp. 1981). There is one exception to the requirement
of specific intent. The statute provides that when death occurs "while committing or at-
tempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or
violence, either upon or affecting the person or another," id. § 609.185(2), specific intent is
not required.
56. The 1981 legislature moved unintentional felony murder from third to second
degree. See Act of May 20, 1981, ch. 227, § 19, 1981 Minn. Laws 1010 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 609.19(2) (Supp. 1981). Manslaughter in the first degree includes heat-of-passion
killings and unintentional homicides during the commission of misdemeanor or gross mis-
demeanor crimes. See MINN. STAT. § 609.20 (Supp. 1981). Negligent homicides are desig-
nated as second degree manslaughter. Set id § 609.205.
57. Such evidence is certainly relevant pursuant to Rule 401 of the Rules of Evidence
promulgated by the supreme court in 1977. Recent cases have held that it is a denial of
due process to exclude evidence of mental illness in the first phase of the bifurcated trial.
See, e.g., Hughes v. Matthews, 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.), cert. dimirssed, Israel v. Hughes, 439
U.S. 801 (1978); State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1009 (1971); Stateex re. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978); Sanchez v. State, 567
P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977).
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to obtain a complete acquittal due to mental illness. This scenario
is wasteful but unavoidable and, by itself, sufficient reason to scrap
the bifurcation process.
The recent case of Slate v. Mikulanec53 demonstrates the status of
the mental illness defense in Minnesota. June Mikulanec was a
twenty-seven-year-old keypunch operator. Until her arrest she
had never been diagnosed or treated in any manner for mental
illness. She developed a particular obsession for a male friend who
dated her occasionally. She told her co-workers that this relation-
ship was far more serious than it really was, and even bought an
engagement ring which she represented as a gift from him. Her
"boyfriend" married another woman. Mikulanec responded by
inflicting ninety-seven knife wounds on her rival. The murder had
several aspects of premeditation, including the calculation of when
the husband would be absent, a ruse to get into the victim's house,
and an elaborate coverup to mislead police into thinking that the
crime was motivated by rape.
59
The jury found Mikulanec not guilty by reason of mental illness.
During the first stage of her bifurcated trial, the defense put the
state to its burden of proving that Mikulanec was the real killer.
Thus, criminal intent was not at issue. The jury found, by virtue
of fairly conclusive circumstantial evidence, that Mikulanec had
killed the victim. At the second stage, the defense psychiatrists di-
agnosed Mikulanec as suffering from "hysterical psychosis,"
'60
notwithstanding that this supposed illness is not mentioned in the
American Psychiatric Association's classification guide of mental
disorders. 61 The prosecution psychiatrist found no psychosis and
testified that the killing was motivated by anger and jealousy.
Mikulanec was found not guilty by reason of insanity.
62
After expending great efforts to prove Mikulanec's sanity, the
county attorney's office found itself in the awkward position of pe-
titioning to commit her as mentally ill and dangerous. They suc-
ceeded in committing her, notwithstanding Mikulanec's attorney's
protest that she was no longer "dangerous." One year later Miku-
lanec was still unsuccessful at removing the designation of "dan-
gerous" and she remains, at this writing, in a locked ward. Her
58. State v. Mikulanec, No. 69142 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Aug. 23, 1978).
59. Id
60. Id
61. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS ch. 3 (3d ed. 1981) (commonly known as DSM-III).
62. State v. Mikulanec, No. 69142 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Aug. 23, 1978).
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keepers contend that, at the very least, she should be transferred to
the open, unsecured portion of the hospital.
63
At all stages the case generated a great deal of publicity. Is
Mikulanec really dangerous? Is there any justification for her con-
tinued confinement in a mental hospital other than an aversion to
the publicity that her release would cause? Is Mikulanec a polit-
ical prisoner? Under the thesis outlined in this article, these ques-
tions would be avoided. Mikulanec's elaborate preparation and
attempts at concealment would have established her premeditated
intent. She would be serving a life sentence for murder.
The case of State v. Sheppo64 presents a more difficult question.
Cora Sheppo was acquitted of killing her grandson by reason of
mental illness. She believed, and believes to this day, that the kill-
ing was necessary to purge the victim of internal demons and as-
sure his everlasting salvation. Because she was convinced of the
rightness of her action, her acquittal pursuant to the M'Naghten
standard was unavoidable. Sheppo acted with the specific intent
to kill.6 5 Under the proposal outlined in this article, she, as well a
Mikulanec, would be convicted of murder.
III. A PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH THE DEFENSES OF MENTAL
ILLNESS AND MENTAL DEFICIENCY
The legislature should strike the M'Naghten language from Min-
nesota Statutes, section 611.026 and substitute the following:
It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the de-
fendant, as a result of mental illness or mental deficiency, lack-
ed the criminal intent as defined by section 609.02, subdivision
9, required as an element of the offense charged. Mental illness
or mental deficiency does not otherwise constitute a defense.
66
This proposal would abolish mental illness and mental deficiency
as a defense to an otherwise criminal act. It would prohibit the
judiciary from resurrecting any test-M'Naghten, Durham, or
63. See In re Mikulanec, item IX, hearing of November 14, 1979 before the Special
Review Bd., Dep't of Pub. Welfare (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
64. State v. Sheppo, No. 76566 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Jan. 14, 1981).
65. Id
66. MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (1980) currently reads:
No person shall be tried, sentenced, or punished for any crime while mentally ill
or mentally deficient so as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings or
making a defense; but he shall not be excused from criminal liability except
upon proof that at the time of committing the alleged criminal act he was labor-
ing under such a defect of reason, from one of these causes, as not to know the
nature of his act, or that it was wrong.
1982]
13
Rathke: Abolition of the Mental Illness Defense
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1982
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
ALI-as a common-law substitute for the statute. The first sen-
tence says nothing more than the proposition that the state's in-
ability to prove any one of the essential elements of the offense is a
defense to a criminal charge. The second sentence states the legis-
lative intent. The courts are thereby on notice that the legislature
has reserved this policy question for itself.
Some persons accused of a crime are so mentally ill or deficient
that they cannot assist in their defense.67 This proposal does not
affect them. These persons are beyond the scope of criminal sanc-
tions, not because they are mentally ill but because a defendant
must be capable of participating in his defense. To try or sentence
a person so grossly mentally ill that he could not assist in his de-
fense would offend anyone's sense of justice as well as the due pro-
cess clause. 6a Thus, if a person charged with a crime appears to be
out of touch with reality, the trial court should order a compe-
tency study pursuant to Rule 20.01. If the defendant is found in-
competent, prosecution authorities would commence proceedings
for civil commitment.
The current procedure appears to work well, and the actors are
not forced into inconsistent positions. In Minnesota, most compe-
tency opinions are obtained from psychiatrists and psychologists at
the several state hospitals operated by the Department of Public
Welfare. Prosecutors and defense attorneys generally accept the
opinions and forego retaining a second set of experts. The trial
court has little difficulty affirming the one opinion at its disposal.
If the defendant is found incompetent to stand trial, the prosecutor
has the benefit of the Rule 20.01 examination in the civil commit-
ment procedure. If the underlying criminal charge is a misde-
meanor, the charge is dismissed.69 Gross misdemeanors and all
felonies except murder are automatically dismissed if the defend-
ant has not achieved competence within three years, unless the
state files a notice of intent to prosecute whenever the defendant
becomes competent.70 As a practical matter, few prosecutors are
interested in resurrecting any but the most serious felony prosecu-
67. Id The statute provides that "[n]o person shall be tried, sentenced, or punished
for any crime while mentally ill or mentally deficient so as to be incapable of. . . making
a defense." Id The pertinent procedure is set forth in MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01.
68. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,
378 (1966); Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1955); State v. Swain,
269 N.W.2d 707, 719 (Minn. 1978).
69. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01, subd. 4(2).
70. Id 20.01(6).
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tions if the defendant has been incompetent to defend himself and
has been held in a state institution for over a year.
Abolition of the mental illness defense would, however, greatly
change the nature of the Rule 20.02 examination. The prosecutor
and defense attorney would need to carefully inform the examin-
ing expert of the essential elements of the offense charged and any
possible, lesser-included offenses. The capacity to form a particu-
lar intent would be the key issue. In a homicide prosecution, for
example, the expert would need a thorough understanding of the
different levels of purposefulness specified by the law, ranging
from premeditation to culpable negligence. 71 After examining the
defendant's mental state and any data supplied by investigating
personnel, the expert would attempt to form an opinion with re-
spect to whether the defendant, at the time of the act, was unable,
because of a mental disorder, to form the criminal intent that the
law requires for the crime under consideration.
In most trials where mental illness or deficiency is at issue, the
identity of the actor is admitted. The defense attorney would at-
tempt to elicit, through cross-examination of the state's witnesses,
evidence of bizarre or unnatural behavior. The prosecution would
decide to call its expert to testify on the question of intent during
the case in chief if the rest of the evidence would not survive a
motion for directed verdict on the issue of intent without the ex-
pert. The state has the burden of proof on the issue of intent. If
defense counsel's cross-examination were sufficient to raise a doubt
in the jury's mind on the question of intent, the prosecutor should
call his expert before resting. Tactical considerations may suggest
keeping some "intent" evidence reserved for rebuttal.
The bifurcated trial, of course, would be eliminated. The
proper question for the jury at the end of the trial is whether the
71. With stated exceptions, a conviction for first degree murder requires a showing of
premeditation and specific intent to kill. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(1) (Supp. 1981). Proof
of premeditation is not required when the victim was a police officer or the killing oc-
curred during a burglary, kidnapping, first or second degree arson, aggravated robbery,
escape from custody or first degree tampering with a witness. Id. §§ 609.185(3), (4).
Neither premeditation or specific intent to kill is necessary when the death occurs during
the commission or attempt to commit first or second degree criminal sexual conduct with
force or violence. Id § 609.185(2).
Except when death occurs during commission or attempt to commit a felony, other
than first or second degree criminal sexual conduct, conviction of second degree murder
requires proof of intent to kill. Id § 609.19.
A person who is culpably negligent by creating an unreasonable risk and consciously
taking chances of death or causing great bodily harm to another, is guilty of second degree
manslaughter. Id § 609.205 (1980). '
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state has proved all of the essential elements beyond a reasonable
doubt. The only burden upon the defense is the practical, but not
legal, necessity of coming forward with evidence to rebut the com-
mon-sense presumption that a person intends the natural conse-
quence of his voluntary acts. 72 If the defense elects to defend solely
on the question of identity, evidence derived from court-ordered
mental evaluations should remain inadmissible. 73 In certain cases,
however, the defense may contend that the defendant neither com-
mitted the act nor was capable of forming the intent to do so. If
the defendant denies to the examining expert that he committed
the act, the expert would have to testify in the framework of a
hypothetical question. 74 If the defendant admits the act to the
psychiatrist further problems arise. By raising the issue of incapac-
ity to form intent by reason of mental illness, the defendant waives
the inadmissibility of his admission. This dilemma for the defense
should not disturb anyone who views a trial as a factfinding
procedure.
At the close of the testimony and final arguments, the trial court
would carefully instruct the jury regarding the essential elements
of the crime charged and any lesser-included offenses. The judge
would emphasize that the state has the obligation of proving all of
the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
When explaining the element of intent the judge would read the
relevant portions of Minnesota Statutes, section 609.02, subdivi-
sion 9. The court would further instruct as follows:
It is not a defense to a crime that the defendant was mentally ill
at the time of his act or that he still is mentally ill. But where,
as in this case, intent, as I defined it to you, is an element of a
crime, you should consider whether the defendant was mentally
ill, and if so, whether the defendant was capable of forming the
required intent. The state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had the intent which the law
requires.
72. In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the United States Supreme Court
held that due process is violated by an instruction to the jury that "the law presumes that
a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." In State v. Ellert, 301
N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 1981), the trial court instructed the jury that it is presumed that a
person intends his or her voluntary act. Because the lower court did not attribute that
presumption to "the law," the Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished Sandstrom and af-
firmed the conviction. Id at 323.
73. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02(5).
74. The defense attorney would pose a question which assumes the facts of the crime
and that the defendant, whom the expert has examined, is the perpetrator.
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The jury would have at its disposal a guilty verdict for the crime
charged, a guilty verdict for each lesser-included offense, and a not
guilty verdict. For the unusual case where the identity of the actor
is at issue, the not guilty verdict should have at its foot the follow-
ing question:
Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the act in question but are unable to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had the capacity to form the required
intent?7
5
This question should be asked to put to rest the question of the
identity of the actor. If answered in the affirmative, the parties
involved, and, later, treatment personnel, can assume that the de-
fendant committed the act. Although theoretically the civil com-
mitment process is de novo, the parties involved, including the
probate court, are entitled to place some value on the criminal
trial jury's answer to this question.
The jury should be informed of the potential for civil commit-
ment. The defendant benefits because the jury is assured that in
the event of a not guilty verdict further legal proceedings are possi-
ble which may result in further confinement and treatment. The
prosecution benefits because the jury knows that commitment is
not automatic, especially if the defendant is no longer psychotic.
This article by no means pioneers discussion of the abolition of
the mental illness defense. For the past twenty years, the contro-
versial Dr. Thomas S. Szasz has advocated the abolition of the
defense. 6 Other theoreticians have concurred. 77 The noted crimi-
nal law professor Norval Morris argued for abolition in 1963,78
and his ideas have been mirrored in a number of law review arti-
cles. 79 The popular press has also criticized the defense.8m In a
most ironic development Judge David Bazelon, the author of Dur-
75. The state district judges have approved special questions on criminal verdict
forms. See, e.g., MINNESOTA PRACTICE JIG, 16.02, 16.23 (1977). The Minnesota jury
instructions for theft and receiving stolen property include the element of knowledge and
belief that the action was wrong.
76. See T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 123-37, 228-29 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as T. SZASZ, LAw, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY]; see also, T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF
MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (rev. ed. 1974).
77. See, e.g., S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 205-59, 341-42
(1971); H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 24-25 (1965); B. WOOTEN,
CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 31-93 (1981).
78. Morris, Psychiaty and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 So. CAL. L. REV. 514 (1968).
79. See Caesar, The Insanity Defense: The New Loophole, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 436
(1979); Goldstein, The Browner Rule--Why? Or No More Nonsense on Non Sense in the Criminal
Law, Please/, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 126; Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense'"--
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ham,"' has come full circle and advocated abolition. 2
At least five legislative bodies have seriously considered abolish-
ing the insanity defense. In 1975 the United States Senate Judici-
ary Committee reported to the floor a position on the defense
identical to that advocated in this article. 3 The fact that this pro-
posal was part of the Nixon administration's controversial S. 1 bill
accounts for at least some of the aversion to the idea. 4 That por-
tion of the bill was deleted in 1977, although the committee report
of that year continued to favor abolition. 5 President Reagan re-
cently introduced the Crime Control Act of 1982 which again
Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Spring, The End ofInsanity, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 23
(1979).
80. A recent article in US News & WorldReport describes how a 26-year-old Chicago
killer wrote an article to a fellow inmate entitled "How to Beat a Murder Rap by In-
sanity." The writer, Thomas Vanda, had been found not guilty by reason of insanity of
the murder of a 15-year-old girl. Fifteen months after his acquittal Vanda was also ac-
cused of the murder of a second young female. His plea: not guilty by reason of insanity.
Behind Growing Outrage over Insanity Pleas, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 7, 1979, at 41;
see also Szasz, Mercenag Pychi'atiy, 174 NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 13, 1976, at 10, 90; The In-
sanity Defense.- Under Fire, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 20, 1981, at 11.
81. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), sets forth the most lib-
eral test of mental illness ever formulated in this country.
82. See Bazelon, Can We Afrd Not to Live Up to Our Moral Pretenses?, 49 N.Y.S.B.J. 10
(1977).
83. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975 TO ACCOMPANY S1 103-17 (Comm. Print
1975). Although several bills are still before the Senate that advocate what is referred to
as the mens rea test, i.e., limiting evidence of insanity to the issue of the state of mind
requisite for the offense, see, e.g., S. 818, S. 2672, S. 2745, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG.
REC. S 11291 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (summary of bills provided by Sen. Thurmond),
the Senate Judiciary Committee has altered its position to advocate a modified M'Naghten
test that would make insanity an affirmative defense and place the burden of persuasion
on the defendant. See S. 2902, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1, 128 CONG. REC. S11392, S11392
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (sponsored by Sen. Thurmond).
84. For three articles critical of the proposal seemingly because the proposal was
sponsored by President Nixon and John Mitchell, see Dershowitz, Abolishing the Insanity
Defense. The Most Signifwant Feature ofthe Administration's Proposed Criminal Code-An Essay, 9
CRIM. L. BULL. 434 (1973); N.Y.U. Colloquium, President Nion's Proposal on the Insanity
Defense, 1 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 297 (1973); Platt, The Proposal to Abolish the Federal Insanity
Defense: A Critique, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 449 (1974). For a more balanced criticism, see
Allen, The Brawner Rule-New Lyricsfor an Old Tune, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 67; Kadish, The
Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273 (1968); Monahan,Abolish the Insanity Defense?-
Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719 (1973); Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to "Abolish"the
Insanity Defense in S. I: Squeezing the Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1976).
85. The judiciary committee's report in 1977 was virtually identical to its earlier posi-
tion but closed with the following comment:
[T]he approach [abolishing the defense] is not only workable but effective. S.
1437, by deleting any reference to the issue, will leave the further development of
the appropriate approach to this problem to the courts in the light of experience
and the accumulating insights of the varied disciplines involved.
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called for limiting evidence of insanity to the issue of intent.8 6 In
1978 the New York Department of Mental Hygiene presented a
report to Governor Hugh Carey recommending that New York
abandon its ALI test8 7 and abolish the insanity defense.88 The
New York legislature amended the procedural aspects of the de-
fense but declined to abolish it.89
In 1979, Montana abolished the defense of mental disease or
defect in criminal actions and provided an alternative sentencing
procedure for the convicted defendant who was suffering from
mental illness at the time he committed the offense. 90 Evidence of
the defendant's mental illness is admissible in a trial on the merits
only to prove that the defendant "did not have a particular state
of mind which is an essential element of the offense charged."
91
Only if the defendant is convicted is evidence that "he was suffer-
ing from a mental disease or defect which rendered him unable to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law" admissible.92 Thus far the statute has
withstood constitutional challenge.
9 3
Idaho abolished the insanity defense for complaints filed on or
after July 1, 1982.94 Evidence relating to a defendant's insanity is
admissible only relating to "the issues of mens rea or any state of
mind which is an element of the offense."
9
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACr OF 1977, S. REP. No.
605, Part 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1977) (footnote omitted).
86. THE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1982, S. 2903, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101, 128
CONG. REC. S 11404, S 11404-05 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (statement by Sen. Byrd).
87. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1975).
88. STATE OF NEW YORK, DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIENE, A REPORT TO GOVERNOR
HUGH L. CAREY ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK (1978) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT TO GOVERNOR HUGH L. CAREY].
89. The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980, ch. 548, 1980 N.Y. LAWS 1616.
90. Act of July 1, 1979, ch. 713, 1979 Mont. Laws 142 (current version at MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-101, -201, -202, -203, -212, -213, -221, -222, -301, -311, -312, -313,
-401, 46-15-301 (1981)).
91. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-201(1) (1981).
When a defendant is found not guilty for the reason that due to a mental disease
or defect he could not have a particular state of mind that is an essential element
of the offense charged, the court shall order a predispositional investigation...
[and] hold a hearing to determine the appropriate disposition of the defendant.
Id § 46-14-301(1).
92. Id §46-14-311.
93. See State v. McKenzie, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 428 (1980).
94. Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 368, § 2, 1982 Idaho Sess. Laws 919, 919 (codified at
IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a) (Supp. 1982)).
95. Id § 2, 1982 Idaho Sess. Laws at 920 (codified at IDAHO CODE § 18-207(c) (Supp.
1982)).
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In 1980, the Kansas legislature took a different approach to
abolishing the insanity defense. 96 The new act does not specifically
limit admission of psychiatric testimony to the issue of intent, but
rather declares that "[a] finding of not guilty by reason of insanity
shall constitute a finding that the acquitted person committed an
act constituting the offense charged or an act constituting a lesser
included crime, except that the person did not possess the requisite
criminal intent. 97 Implicit in this new statute is the abolition of
insanity as a separate defense.
IV. ADVANTAGES OF ABOLISHING THE MENTAL ILLNESS
DEFENSE
The proposal to abolish the insanity defense has attracted sup-
port because of its appeal to several constituencies. Those who re-
gard the defense as a loophole for the guilty to escape punishment
are favorably disposed to its closure. Civil libertarians concerned
about fair and equal treatment for the disadvantaged are likely to
prefer the due process safeguards present in the criminal justice
system over the coercive therapeutic treatment that could accom-
pany indeterminate civil commitment. Both attorneys and psychi-
atrists have expressed dismay over the tension that the defense
causes between their two professions. Taxpayers are disturbed at
the cost to the public treasury, especially in view of increasingly
scarce fiscal resources.
A. Protection of Society
Although citizens are generally willing to take some responsibil-
ity for their own safety, they expect their government to provide a
large measure of their personal, physical security. Prudent persons
mitigate their exposure to physical violence by, for example,
avoiding unsafe neighborhoods, tough saloons, and family re-
unions. Gun-wielding muggers, belligerent drunks, and irate
aunts are easily understood and just as easily avoided--or so the
common wisdom goes. But the deranged, stalking killer terrifies
average citizens to a degree that bears no relation to their chances
of becoming his next victim. Being cautious will not help; staying
home will not help. The David Berkowitzes, Charles Whitmans,
and Albert DeSalvos seen on the evening news kill for no apparent
96. Act of Apr. 9, 1980, ch. 105, 1980 Kan. Sess. Laws 483.
97. Id § 1, 1980 Kan. Sess. Laws at 483 (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(1)).
The new statute went into effect July 1, 1980.
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reason and without warning.98 No one is safe from the mad killers
depicted in Psycho or Halloween. When the insane killer in newspa-
per headlines is apprehended and uses his insanity as a defense,
people expect their government to intervene. They want him
locked up forever. The location of his confinement-insane asy-
lum or prison-is immaterial as long as he never gets out.
The critical reader will, of course, discount the foregoing as con-
juring hobgoblins and pandering to the bigotry and ignorance of
the unsophisticated public. Nevertheless, the public's fear of the
mentally ill and dangerous criminal is worth considering for at
least three reasons. Champions of the insanity plea rarely fail to
emphasize the concept of blameworthiness and the inapplicability
of that concept to the mentally ill.99 As the Rawland court con-
tended, "a basic postulate of our criminal law is a free agent con-
fronted with the choice between doing right and doing wrong and
choosing freely to do the wrong." ° Those who argue that this
postulate is basic may be forgetting an even more basic postulate:
People should be secure from those who would do them harm re-
gardless of the wrongdoer's knowledge of good and evil. Second,
abolition of the insanity defense would have no effect on the vast
majority of persons who may, from time to time, suffer from
mental disorders. Only those who harm others would suffer the
criminal sanctions. Finally, in the last twenty years a great change
has occurred with respect to treatment of the mentally ill. Gone
are the days when the public could confidently expect that a men-
tally ill person who committed a criminal act would be confined
for an extended period of time.
Dr. Szasz had protested against the broad criteria for involun-
tary commitment and the extended terms for which mentally ill
person were confined,10 but reform did not occur until the devel-
opment and acceptance of psychotropic medications in the
1960's. 102 Through the use of these medications even an acutely
98. David Berkowitz killed six strangers with a handgun in New York from 1976 to
1977, Crme, 38 FACTS ON FILE 500 (1978); Charles Whitman shot 46 passersbys from a
tower at the University of Texas in 1966. See J. NASH, BLOOD LETERS AND BAD MEN
607 (1973). Albert de Salvo was suspected of being the notorious "Boston Strangler" of
the 1960's. See J. GAUTE & R. ODELL, MURDERERS' WHO'S WHO 48-49 (1979).
99. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 84; Monahan, supra note 84.
100. State v. Rawlands, 294 Minn. 17, 32, 199 N.W.2d 774, 788 (1972),see supra note 1
and accompanying text.
101. T. SzASz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY, supra note 76.
102. See Slovenko & Luby, On the Emancipation of Mental Patients, 3 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
191, 194 (1975).
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disturbed patient might respond to treatment within a short time
and be safely discharged. 10 3 Mental hospitals, therefore, were able
to reduce their populations drastically.
At the same time changing legal standards have made the invol-
untary commitment and institutionalization of mentally ill per-
sons more difficult.' 0 4 This fact is critical because those found not
guilty by reason of mental illness undergo the same civil commit-
ment procedure as those who have not committed a crime. By
enacting the Community Mental Health Centers Act in 1963,105
Congress offered substantial inducements for states to reduce the
number of institutionalized patients. Minnesota revised its com-
mitment procedure in 1967. t° 6 Under the revised procedure, a
person could be involuntarily committed as mentally ill if he had a
"psychiatric or other disorder which substantially [impaired] his
mental health and [was] in need of treatment or supervision.'
0 7
The 1967 Minnesota statute also provided for commitment as
"mentally ill and dangerous" although the criteria for dangerous-
ness were not defined. 08 The legislature established the Special'
Review Board in 1971 to review mentally ill and dangerous pa-
tients who desired to transfer from the Minnesota Security Hospi-
tal.'0 9 A more drastic change was made in 1974 when an
amendment to the standard for involuntary commitment required
(1) that the evidence of the proposed patient's conduct clearly
shows that his customary self-control, judgment, and discretion
in the conduct of his affairs and social relations is lessened to
such an extent that hospitalization is necessary for his own wel-
103. See Wright, Problems in Adiinisteinng the Insanity Defense in REPORT OF GOVERNOR
HUGH L. CAREY, supra note 88, at 114-15.
104. See infra notes 105-16 and accompanying text. An internal study done for the
Department of Public Welfare noted that the average daily mentally ill resident popula-
tion declined by 80% over the period from 1962 to 1977. The study noted that the decline
in patient population was due in part to "the enactment of state and federal laws pertain-
ing to. . . [the] protection of patients' rights." See RESIDENTIAL CARE IN MINNESOTA 2
(1977) (on file at the William Mitchell Law Review office).
105. Pub. L. 88-164 Title II; 77 Stat. 290 (1963) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2689-
2689aa (1981)). For a recent critical review of this act, see Wickenden, Mental Health's
Malady, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 15, 1981, at 19.
106. Minnesota Hospitalization and Commitment Act, ch. 638, 1967 Minn. Laws 1294
(current version at MINN. STAT. §§ 253A.01-.21 (1980)).
107. Id § 2(3), 1967 Minn. Laws at 1295 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 253A.02(3)
(1980)).
108. See id § 7(17)(c), 1967 Minn. Laws at 1302 (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 253A.07(17)(c) (1980)).
109. See Act of May 13, 1971, ch. 262, §§ 9, 10, 12, 1971 Minn. Laws 470, 472-73, 475
(codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 253A.15(2)(a), .16(1), .16(5) (1980)).
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fare or the protection of society; that is, that the evidence of his
conduct clearly shows: (i) that he has attempted to or
threatened to take his own life or attempted to seriously physi-
cally harm himself or others; or (ii) that he has failed to protect
himself from exploitation from others; or (iii) that he has failed
to care for his own needs for food, clothing, shelter, safety or
medical care; and (2) after careful consideration of reasonable
alternative dispositions, including but not limited to, dismissal
of petition, out-patient care, informal or voluntary hospitaliza-
tion in a private or public facility, appointment of a guardian
or release before commitment as provided for in Minnesota
Statutes, Section 253A. 12, and finds no suitable alternative to
involuntary hospitalization. " 0
Similar strict standards were enacted in 1975 for commitment of
mentally deficient persons."'I The Minnesota Commitment Act of
1982 retains the standards set in 1974 and 1975 for involuntary
commitment. 112
Court decisions have promulgated increasingly problematic
standards regarding involuntary commitments. In 1975, the
United States Supreme Court held that overtly dangerous behav-
ior was necessary to support an involuntary commitment.' 3 A
more recent Minnesota decision requires a probable cause hearing
within seventy-two hours of an involuntary hold. 1 4 Finally, pur-
suant to a settlement agreed upon by Hennepin County in a fed-
eral district court, the cases of those involuntarily committed must
be reviewed on an annual basis.' 
1 5
This medical, legislative and judicial activity has made it more
difficult to involuntarily commit people and keep them confined.
Perhaps this trend is desirable, but remember that these same ben-
efits must be afforded to any person who violates the criminal code
and is acquitted because of a successful mental illness defense. If a
110. Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 482, § 4, 1974 Minn. Laws 1209, 1210 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 253A.07(17)(a) (1980)).
111. Act of June 2, 1975, ch. 208, 1975 Minn. Laws 612 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§§ 252A.01-.21, 253A.07(17)(b) (1980)).
112. Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982, ch. 581, §§ 2, 9, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
1286, 1287-88, 1296 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 253B.02(13), .09(1)). Sec-
tion 253B.09(l) requires the court to find that "by clear and convincing evidence that the
proposed patient is a mentally ill" person and "that there is no suitable alternative to
judicial commitment." Section 253B.02(13) defines "mentally ill person" to include those
behaviors previously enumerated in MINN. STAT. § 253A.07, subd. 17(a) (1980).
113. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
114. See State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356, 365 (Minn. 1980).
115. See Vickerman v. Hennepin County Probate Court, No. 4-78 Civ. 376 (D. Minn.
Dec. 29, 1980).
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defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, constitutional
standards prohibit his restraint on a basis unequal to other civilly
committed persons." t6 Therefore, if society wishes to more effec-
tively restrain those who violate the law but are mentally ill, the
mental illness defense must be restricted or eliminated.
Predictably, more defendants avail themselves of the insanity
defense because success no longer leads to long-term confinement
in mental institutions. "17 The increased use of the defense together
with its use in widely publicized trials have led to increased criti-
cism of the defense.118
B. Fair Treatment of the Mentally Ill Defendant
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the advantages of the in-
sanity defense for those with symptoms of mental illness. The de-
fense also has characteristics that handicap those who avail
themselves of it. Alexander and Staub 19 describe two types of
criminals: normal and neurotic. For the normal criminal, the
traditional punishment of retributive incarceration is acceptable.
If the criminal is neurotic, punishment is inappropriate. Instead,
the criminal should "be turned over to a special agency for psycho-
analytically minded reeducation, or to a psychoanalyst for
treatment ."120
The premise for this "reeducation" or "treatment" is as follows:
We propose a more consistent application of the principle that
not the deed but the doer should be punished. . . . The implementa-
tion of this principle requires expert diagnostic judgment which can
be expected only from specially trained psychiatric experts. Before
any sentence is imposed, a medical-legal diagnosis should be required
.. . . The neurotic criminal obviously has a limited sense of re-
sponsibility. Primarily, he is a sick person, and his delinquency is the
outcome of his emotional disturbances. This fact, however, should
not exempt him from the consequences of his action. If he is
curable, he should be incarceratedfor the duration ofpsychiatric treatment
116. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
117. In the State of New York only 53 persons were found not guilty by reason of
insanity from mid-1965 until mid-1971. See Steadman, Pasewark & Pantle, The Use of the
Insanity Defense in REPORT TO GOVERNOR HUGH L. CAREY, supra note 88, at 40. This
figure increased over four-fold, to 225, during the five-year period of mid-1971 until mid-
1976. Id at 53.
118. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
119. F. ALEXANDER & H. STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYsIs (1956).
120. Id at 210 (emphasis in original).
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so long as he still represents a menace to society. If he is incur-
able, he belongs in a hospitalfor incurables for lfe.
12 1
Bernard Diamond, an eminent forensic psychiatrist essentially
concurs with the Alexander and Staub analysis. Diamond consid-
ers the entry of psychiatry into the courtroom to be the sacred mis-
sion of psychiatry.122
This concept of the "Therapeutic State" conflicts with civil lib-
ertarian philosophy. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union uses inde-
terminate confinement in mental institutions as a common method
to control both criminals and dissidents. The concept presupposes
that the "normal" can be distinguished from the "neurotic."
Rather than punish the offender, the Therapeutic State redefines
him. Once it has labeled an offender as "sick," "insane" or "men-
tally ill," the state can more freely impose coercive "treatment" for
the offender's own good. The offender is adjudicated not for what
he has done but what he is. He is held not because that is his just
desert, but because of his status. He is discharged not because his
punishment has been insufficient, but because his status has been
redefined by the experts. 23
What if, because of insanity, the defendant is incapable of pos-
sessing the essential element of intent for the crime charged? Gen-
erally, such defendants are found not guilty because of insanity or
mental illness.124 This finding seldom results in a complete release.
Instead, the defendant is committed, either automatically or by a
separate proceeding, to a mental institution for an indeterminate
period of time. Indeed, an essential function of the insanity ver-
dict is to incarcerate those who are not guilty of any crime due to
their lack of criminal intent. 125 Just as the guilty verdict labels an
individual as "bad," the not guilty verdict is intended to avoid
that label and to provide exoneration. The not-guilty-by-reason-
of-mental-illness verdict provides no exoneration. Instead, it im-
poses the label "mad and bad."'1 26 This double stigma can be
avoided only by abolishing the defense. The focus should be on
the ability of the accused to possess the required criminal intent. If
he lacked that ability, then the verdict should be not guilty. The
121. Id at xii-xiii (emphasis added).
122. Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mental Ill, 14 STAN. L. REv. 59 (1961).
123. See generally T. SzAsz, LAw, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY, supra note 76, at 123-48.
124. See Goldstein & Katz, supra note 79, at 864-68.
125. See id. at 864-66.
126. See Morris, supra note 78, at 524-26.
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defendant is entitled to and should be granted the complete exon-
eration concomitant with that verdict.
Discriminatory application appears as another serious shortcom-
ing of the mental illness defense. The defense is particularly sus-
ceptible to advantageous use by upper and upper middle-class
offenders. Despite the authoritarian nature of the Therapeutic
State, recent legislative and judicial actions have lessened the
threat to civil liberties posed by indefinite commitment.1 27 Upper
class defendants are especially able to take advantage of this para-
dox. An educated and articulate individual is more likely to con-
vince a psychiatrist that he manifests a mental disorder and is
susceptible to treatment. A defendant from an upper-class family
is able to afford the battery of distinguished experts necessary to
persuade the decisionmakers in the criminal justice system that
psychiatric diversion is appropriate. Indeed, the possibility of pro-
tracted litigation involving a seemingly endless parade of highly
qualified mental health experts is sufficient to intimidate many
harried prosecutors into agreement with defense proposed disposi-
tions. Such dispositions normally involve inpatient treatment.
Again, the middle and upper classes benefit from their ability to
afford private hospitalization. Finally, the same psychiatric ex-
perts who assisted the patient in avoiding penal sanctions can be
marshalled to ensure release from the hospital at the earliest
opportunity.
Contrast these circumstances with those facing the lower income
person suffering from a mental disorder. His public defender has
difficulty justifying the time and effort needed to prepare the de-
fense. The defendant's only expert will be a state psychiatrist em-
ployed at a public mental institution. Both low intelligence and
educational skills might impede the defendant's ability to commu-
nicate and describe his thought processes. If the defendant suc-
cessfully avoids penal sanctions, his place of commitment will be a
state institution. There, the length of his stay remains entirely at
the mercy of the staff.
A recent New York study of patients who successfully asserted
the insanity defense demonstrated four subgroups in the patient
population. The subgroups were (1) mothers who killed a family
member, (2) police officers, (3) persons with whom the public
could empathize (defined as the "I-can-feel-sorry-for-you" sub-
127. See supra notes 101-16 and accompanying text.
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group), and (4) persons of "respectability."1 2 None of these sub-
groups are representative of the masses that pass through the
criminal justice system. Each, however, possesses qualities particu-
larly useful for the successful assertion of the mental illness defense.
These qualities are also useful in obtaining early release from a
mental institution.
The Patricia Hearst case presents an extreme example of the
disparate application of the insanity defense. Dr. Louis J. West,
chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of
California at Los Angeles, wrote to the Hearst family advising
them that "powerful legal and medical arguments can be mobil-
ized in [their daughter's] defense."1 29 The letter was unsolicited
and written before Hearst was captured. Dr. West was, of course,
recruited and testified for Hearst's defense. When questioned con-
cerning his letter and the possibility that it demonstrated bias,
West replied that he wrote to the family "as one parent to an-
other."'13 As Dr. Szasz acidly remarked, the fact "that the Hearsts
are rich and powerful obviously had nothing to do with it.''
3
The mental illness defense also discriminates in the manner in
which it relates to the concept of free will. By characterizing the
insane as lacking the ability to choose "freely to do the wrong,"'
32
the law presumes that the rest of mankind possesses a free will and
is blameworthy. If psychiatry can excuse a defendant from his
otherwise criminal acts, why not permit the sociologists to con-
struct a defense for the grossly deprived? Certainly a life of abject
poverty circumscribes freedom of choice as effectively as mental
illness. Evidence of mental illness should receive the same consid-
eration as many other conditions which affect a defendant's moti-
vation. Drunkenness, stupidity, hunger and physical handicaps
should all be relevant for the limited purpose of educating the fact-
finder about the existence of criminal intent. 33
Because abolition of the mental illness defense will restrict the
use of psychiatric testimony and result in more convictions, how
does abolition provide fairer treatment for the accused? Abolition
puts the mentally ill on the same footing as the rest of society by
requiring all persons to be responsible for their acts if they possess
128. See Steadman, Pasewark & Pantle, supra note 117, at 68-71.
129. Szasz, supra note 80, at 10.
130. Id at 11.
131. Id
132. See supra note I and accompanying text.
133. See S. HALLECK, supra note 77, at 205-29; Morris, supra note 78, at 518-20.
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the required criminal intent. Indeed, one of the first tasks of a
treating psychiatrist is to impress the mentally ill patient with the
fact that he is responsible for his actions. 13 4 To deprive a person of
the notion that he is a free, responsible individual is to separate
that person from his peers. To insist upon his responsibility is to
restore his humanity.
C The Administration of the Criminal Justice System
Few areas of the substantive criminal law have evoked as much
comment and criticism as the insanity defense. The published de-
bate over which insanity standard is best has denuded forests. One
standard-Durham ' 35-was proposed with wild enthusiasm in
1954, only to be abandoned within eighteen years. 36 The states
are still sharply divided between those who have adopted the ALI
test 137 and those who cling to M'Naghten. 138 Seven states have re-
cently enacted the "guilty-but-mentally-ill" verdict. 139 President
Reagan who had proposed federal reform which appears to paral-
lel this new verdict has changed his position to support the type of
reform advocated by this paper.14° Meanwhile, a growing dissatis-
faction among the public appears evident.' 4 1 Despite of all the
debate over which test or standard is most appropriate, studies
suggest that juries do not distinguish them.
142
One of the causes of this concern and uncertainty lies in the
attitude of the psychiatric profession. If psychiatrists could reach a
consensus regarding their role in the courtroom, a natural defer-
ence to their expertise might develop. This has not occurred.
When such eminent psychiatrists as Szasz and Diamond cannot
even agree on whether mental illness existsl 4 3-- to say nothing of
134. See S. HALLECK, supra note 77, at 205-29; Allen, supra note 84, at 514, 518-20.
135. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954); see supra notes
12-16 and accompanying text.
136. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see Note, supra note
5, at notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
137. See Note, supra note 5, at note 48 and accompanying text.
138. See id at notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
139. See infta notes 196-211 and accompanying text.
140. Compare The Crime Control Act of 1982, S. 2903, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101, Cong.
Rec. S 11404 (dailyed. Sept. 14, 1982), with ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIO-
LENT CRIME, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 54 (1981).
141. See supra notes 80 & 118 and accompanying text.
142. M. GUTTMACHER, THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN LAW 17-18 (1968).
143. See Robitscher, The Impact of New Legal Standards on Psychiaty or Who Are David
Bazelon and Thomas Szasz and Why Are They Saying Such Terrble Things About Us or Authontan-
anirm Versus Nhilsm in Legal Psvchiatry, 1975 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 151.
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its definition-attorneys and policymakers are left in a quandary.
Although attorneys, judges and members of the general public
often criticize the psychiatric profession for its uncertainty, the
sharpest barbs come from within its own ranks. Dr. Joel Fort has
consulted or testified in over 300 criminal cases during a thirty-
year period. Nevertheless, he has no desire to claim the role of an
"expert" for himself or any other psychiatrist.
No standards of relevant training and experience have ever
been established for experts on criminal responsibility. Those
who pose as experts in courtrooms often know nothing about
the issues in question. . . . [P]sychiatry dominates, due to self-
aggrandizement by the profession and judicial ignorance.
144
Fort is especially concerned about the lack of objectivity character-
istic of his colleagues.
Most psychiatric "experts" testify only for the defense. Many
seem to assume that murderers and other serious criminals
should be hospitalized for "rehabilitation," not imprisoned for
their crimes. The courtroom behaviorists seem relatively un-
concerned about the victims, their families or the protection of
society in general. 145
Fort advocates "specific standards of training and experience for
experts before they are allowed to testify."'1
Dr. Lawrence C. Kolb, a forensic psychiatrist and past president
of the American Psychiatric Association, also has doubts concern-
ing the expertise of his profession.
I am convinced that the competence of the specialty is exceeded
by much of current practice. Psychiatric examinations are
made after the fact. It is beyond the capacity of a psychiatrist
to comprehend the defendant's capacity to define the rightness
or wrongness of his action taken at the time the act was com-
mitted. . . .[P]sychiatrists answering such questions are forced
almost to the verge of unethical behavior-forced by the in-
stance of legal procedures derived from a 19th century concep-
tion of the psychology of man . ...
The acceptance by the specialty of psychiatry of the adver-
sarial position, with often competing testimony given by several
members of the same specialty, damages the public respect due
144. Fort, Doubts About Courtroom Experts, 7 HUM. BEHAV. 70 (Dec. 1978).
145. Id
146. Id
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to the specialty.1
47
Kolb suggests that the "single place" for the psychiatrist in the
courtroom is to assist the judge in making an effective disposition
after guilt has been determined1
48
Psychiatry is especially vulnerable to public ridicule when its
leading authorities find themselves in vehement disagreement in
high profile trials such as those of Sirhan Sirhan,149 Patricia
Hearst,15° John Hinckley, Jr.,15 1 and Ming Sen Shiue.152 Of equal
concern is the misallocation of resources that such trials cause. In
1977 Dr. Seymour Pollack estimated that one million court related
consultations occur each year.153 Thankfully, few are as extensive
as those relating to the Hearst case. The talent and money spent
on consultations and lengthy trials would be better used if chan-
neled into the care and treatment of the patients in the state
hospitals.
Abolition of the insanity defense would not eliminate psychiat-
ric testimony from the courtroom. As noted previously, a defend-
ant has the right to introduce evidence indicating that a mental
disorder robbed him of the capacity to form the criminal intent
essential to the commission of the crime. 54 Abolition should, how-
ever, decrease the quantity and increase the quality of psychiatric
testimony. The psychiatrist would be limited to testimony on the
defendant's capacity to intend to commit a particular act. The
psychiatrist would be permitted
to describe the defendant's mental condition and symptoms, his
pathological beliefs and motivations, if he was thus afflicted,
and to explain how these influenced or would have influenced
147. Kolb, Refltions on the Insanity Defense, in REPORT TO GOVERNOR HUGH L. CA-
REY, supra note 88, at 101-03.
148. Id at 103.
149. On June 5, 1968, in the Los Angeles Ambassador Motel, Sirhan Sirhan shot and
killed Robert Kennedy. See J. NASH, supra note 98, at 504.
150. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
151. John Hinckley, Jr. was found not guilty by reason of insanity for attempting to
assassinate President Reagan, and other crimes. Some commentators stated that the
Hinckley trial exemplified how psychiatry can make "insanity trials expensive circuses."
See Jost, No Rush to Understanding, L.A. Daily J., June 28, 1982, at 2, col. 5.
152. Shiue was convicted of kidnapping a former school teacher of his. Se United
States v. Shiue, 508 F. Supp. 455, 460 (D. Minn. 1980), affd, 650 F.2d 919, 924 (8th Cir.
1981). On February 21, 1981, a state jury also found Shiue guilty ofsecond degree murder
and kidnapping. See State v. Shiue, File No. F4990 (Minn. 10th Dist. Ct. Mar. 9, 1981),
afd, 326 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1982).
153. Robitscher & Williams, Should Psychiatrits Gel Out of the Courtroom?, 11 PSYCHOL-
oGY TODAY 84, 85 (1977).
154. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
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his behavior, particularly his mental capacity knowingly [to
commit the crime charged].' 55
This testimony is clearly within the expertise of a forensic psychia-
trist. Psychiatrists are more likely than not to agree on a particular
diagnosis and describe how a particular disorder affected the indi-
vidual's mental process. What they are not able to agree upon is
whether a person knew right from wrong. Abolition of the in-
sanity defense eliminates the need for that opinion.
V. OBJECTIONS TO ABOLITION AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES
Although abolishing the insanity defense has advantages, signifi-
cant issues must be resolved before taking that step. The concept
of blameworthiness is central to the defense and may have consti-
tutional status. 156 Proponents of the insanity defense contend that
its abolition will lead criminal law into the morass of the concept
of "diminished capacity. 1 57 Three states have invented the
"guilty-but-mentally-ill" verdict which, some argue, obviates the
need for complete abolition.ls The remainder of this article will
discuss these issues.
A. Blameworthiness and the Constitution
The Durham court made the point quite succinctly: "Our collec-
tive conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose
blame."159 If a mental disorder has robbed a person of his free
will, how can society convict that person? When society finds it
expedient to convict the morally innocent, the distinction between
good and evil is blurred. Society needs this distinction for sym-
bolic purposes. The criminal trial is, the argument goes, a moral-
ity play with a full gallery of citizen spectators.6
The concept of blame, or mens rea, however, has always had a
broader purpose than invalidating the insanity defense. The re-
quirement of criminal intent would survive the elimination of the
155. Rhodes v. United States, 282 F.2d 59, 62 (4th Cir. 1960); accord Carnahan, Legal
Perspectives on the Insanity Defense, in REPORT TO GOVERNOR HUGH L. CAREY, supra note
88, at 24-25.
156. See ifra notes 159-82 and accompanying text.
157. See in/a notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
158. See inf/a notes 196-211 and accompanying text.
159. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (quoting Holloway
v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945)). The Durham court stated that juries
will continue to make moral judgments in these cases, believing that if no blame can be
imposed on an individual, neither should punishment. Id
160. See Monahan, supra note 84, at 721.
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insanity plea. Mens rea would live on. 61 The requirement of
criminal intent would continue to exonerate a person who acciden-
tally caused the death of someone else. The same result would
occur if a person literally did not know what he was doing when he
struck the fatal blow. Such a defendant has no need for M'A"aghten
or any other insanity test. He lacks the mens rea required by the
legislative definition of the crime.
Some commentators have criticized the abolitionist view, stating
correctly that "[y]ou can change the name of the game, but you
cannot avoid playing it so long as mens rea is required. 1 62 This
simply illustrates that abolishing the defense is not the act of a
butcher, using a meat axe to hack away at basic legal concepts.
Instead, it is a modest excision-the removal of an area of law
which has outlived its usefulness.
The insanity defense once had arguably necessary objectives.
When the defense was created, the death penalty for numerous
offenses was more than an empty threat.163 The history of crimi-
nal law is replete with legal fictions and rigid pleading require-
ments designed to mitigate the law's cruelty. The insanity defense
softened the law's rigid requirements. Now, post-conviction dispo-
sitions are sufficiently flexible and humane to permit society to re-
tire the insanity defense./64
A less frequently stated goal of the defense is to retain jurisdic-
tion over a person who has not committed a crime.165 By defining
it as an all-or-nothing defense, courts have precluded testimony of
mental disorder affecting intent--even though intent is an essen-
tial element of the offense charged.66 When a person has a gross
mental disorder and is so deranged that he is unaware of what he
is doing, the prosecution cannot prove criminal intent. Although
an acquittal deprives the state of jurisdiction over the same person,
161. Some would do away entirely with mens rea until the dispositional hearing. See,
e.g., B. WOOTEN, supra note 77, at 47-90.
162. See Kadish, supra note 84, at 282.
163. "Capital punishment is not an essential element in the original definition [of fel-
ony], but was for long so closely associated with felony that until 1827, if a statute made a
new offense felony, the law implied that it should be punished not merely by forfeiture but
also by death. . . ." 1 RUSSELL ON CRIME 4 (Turner 12th ed. 1964).
Until the end of the nineteenth century, deterrence was seen as the primary purpose
for punishment of criminals. Because death was the ultimate deterrent, it was the pre-
ferred penalty. See P. FITZGERALD, CRIMINAL LAW AND PUNISHMENT 207-08 (1962).
164. See Kadish supra note 84.
165. See Goldstein & Katz, supra note 79, at 864-69.
166. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
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the same is not true of the not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict.
In fact, in the days of automatic commitment, a person could be
incarcerated for life even if the crime charged was relatively mi-
nor. 67 The demise of the automatic commitment and the advent
of reform of the law concerning the mentally ill has made long-
term retention of jurisdiction unacceptable.
Thus, the more pragmatic goals of the insanity defense, avoid-
ance of the death penalty and retention of jurisdiction over those
not guilty, no longer apply. Defenders argue that the concept of
blameworthiness underscores the public's need for at least the per-
ception of responsibility.168 The insanity defense can subvert that
goal. Although acquittals by reason of insanity might be few, the
public increasingly views the defense as a means to avoid responsi-
bility. The defense is ineffective for building a perception of re-
sponsibility amongst the citizenry.
Minnesota has recently reviewed the goals and objectives of its
criminal sanctions. In 1978 the legislature created the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission and required that commission to draft ad-
visory guidelines for judges. 169 The sentences were to be determi-
nate and based upon reasonable offense and offender
characteristics.1 70 In its 1980 report the commission adopted a
clear objective for making sentencing decisions: the offender is to
be given his just, commensurate deserts.' 7' Minnesota should
abolish the insanity defense only if its abolition is consistent with a
just-deserts sentencing philosophy.
Is it just to blame or convict an offender who is mentally ill? To
address that question, we must first exclude those incompetent to
stand trial. Second, we must exclude those so grossly mentally ill
that they are incapable of forming the intent required by the defi-
nition of the crime. Thus we have used the ancient concept of
mens rea to divert those whose lack of blame is self-evident. We
are left with intentional wrongdoers who, because of mental disor-
der, cannot know their conduct is wrong.
Minnesota's sentencing guidelines can accommodate these types
of convicted persons. Although prison incarceration is mandatory
167. Se T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY, supra note 76, at 123-37, 228-29.
168. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
169. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 723, § 9, 1978 Minn. Laws 761, 765-66 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 244.09(5) (1980)).
170. Id (codified at MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 5(2) (1980)).
171. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDEUNES COMM'N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY art. I (1980).
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for serious crimes against persons, the sentencing judge may depart
from the prison sentence if the "offender, because of physical or
mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for judgment
when the offense was committed. 17 2 If the sentence is stayed, the
judge may put the offender on probation subject to conditions
which take into account the offender's mental disorder.17 3 Even if
the mentally ill offender is sent to prison, the Commissioner of
Corrections has authority to temporarily transfer the prisoner to
the Security Hospital.
74
Thus, the issue must be stated more narrowly: Is it just to blame
(convict) a mentally ill person who has intentionally committed a
criminal act where dispositional alternatives substantially similar
to those for the non-criminal mentally ill are available? Or, to
paraphrase Durham, "Does our collective conscience allow us to im-
pose blame?" This question, as is true of the entire insanity issue,
is subjective. As Goldstein and Katz noted,
The court leaves without definition and without identification
of purpose such ambiguous words as "punishment" and
"blame" and thus in effect only says "he who is punishable is
blameworthy and he who is blameworthy is punishable.
'1 75
Given the vague standards of the insanity defense, its arbitrary ap-
plication, its administrative pitfalls and its inability to provide se-
curity to the public, labeling intentional wrongdoing by a
mentally ill person as criminal and dealing with his particular
malady within the context of that criminal conviction is just.
Some argue that the concept of insanity has become so inter-
twined with blameworthiness and mens rea that it has achieved
constitutional stature.176 As shown above, however, abolition of
the defense leaves mens rea untouched. Two state courts have
overturned legislative attempts to abolish the insanity defense on
state constitutional grounds: Washington in 1910177 and Missis-
sippi in 1931.178 Both statutes did more than abolish the plea; both
statutes prohibited the admission of evidence of mental disorder. 179
172. Id art. II.D.103.
173. MINN. STAT. § 609.135 (1980) (dealing with stay and imposition or execution of
sentences).
174. Id §§ 241.07, .69(3) (1980).
175. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 79, at 860.
176. See, e.g., Wales, supra note 84, at 702-04.
177. See State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 119, 110 P. 1020, 1024 (1910).
178. Set Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 153-54, 132 So. 581, 582 (1931) (per curiam).
179. Act of Apr. 3, 1928, ch. 75, 1928 Miss. Laws 92; Act of Mar. 22, 1909, ch. 249, § 7,
1909 Wash. Sess. Laws 890, 891-92.
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This prohibition particularly impressed the Washington court.
To take from the accused the opportunity to offer evidence
tending to prove this fact is in our opinion as much a violation
of his constitutional right of trial by jury as to take from him
the right to offer evidence before the jury tending to show that
he did not physically commit the act . . . .
Contemporary defense attorneys who might rely on those two
cases would be hard pressed to find other state court decisions over
fifty years old for which they show so much respect. More compel-
ling are the words of the United States Supreme Court in Powell v.
Texas :181
[T]his Court has never articulated a general constitutional doc-
trine of mens tea.
• . . The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake,
justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for
a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the
evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious,
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man.
This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the
province of the States.
• . . [F]ormulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not
eliminate, the fruitful experimentation, and freeze the develop-
ing productive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a
rigid constitutional mold. It is simply not yet the time to write
into the Constitution formulas cast in terms whose meaning, let
alone relevance, is not yet clear either to doctors or to
lawyers. 1
82
As long as the evidence of mental disorder is admissible to negate
intent and the court retains its healthy deference to the legislature
in policy matters, abolition of the defense of mental illness is not
constitutionally offensive.
B. Diminished Capacity
By focusing on the issue of intent, the proposal suggested by this
article incorporates the doctrine sometimes referred to as "dimin-
ished capacity." Evidence of mental disorder is admissible to deter-
mine if the defendant's capacity to form the requisite criminal
intent has been diminished. The California case of People v.
180. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 119, 110 P. 1020, 1024 (1910).
181. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
182. Id at 535-37 (footnotes omitted).
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Wells 18 3 was one of the first decisions to clearly express the con-
cept, reversing a murder conviction because the trial court pre-
vented the defendant from trying to prove the absence of malice
aforethought. Wells conservatively limited the defense to proof re-
lating directly to the specifically required state of mind. 18 4 Unfor-
tunately, the court broadened the concept ten years later in People
v. Gorshen' 85 by permitting the defense to introduce any evidence
which tended to show that the defendant's capacity had been re-
duced. This expansion continued in People v. Wol a8 6 which al-
lowed testimony of the defendant's capacity to evaluate what he
was doing. 8 7 Thus, California has adopted a subjective dimin-
ished responsibility standard which cannot be applied consistently
because it lacks objective criteria.' 8
The California experience can and should be avoided. Minne-
sota's statute should be amended to state that it is a "defense...
that the defendant, as a result of mental illness or mental defi-
ciency, lacked the crinznal intent, as defined by Section 609.02, Sub-
division 9, required as an element of the offense charged." This
language would put the courts on notice that the legislature in-
tends to restrict evidence of mental illness to that relating to the
criminal intent which is an element of the offense charged.
Minnesota already permits juries to consider diminished capac-
ity due to intoxication. 8 9 Getting drunk is a voluntary act. For
the law to lessen criminal responsibility for a drunk but to deny a
similar opportunity to a mentally ill person is incongruous at best.
Even without legislative change, diminished capacity is un-
doubtedly the law in Minnesota. A trial court could not constitu-
tionally exclude psychiatric testimony that negates criminal intent.
183. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949), overruled in part,
People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978) (no distinc-
tion between evidence which tends to prove insanity and evidence probative of diminished
capacity).
184. Id at 356-57, 202 P.2d at 69.
185. 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959), ovemi/ed in part, People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal.
3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978).
186. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
187. Id at 808-09, 394 P.2d at 967-68, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 279-80.
188. See Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two
Children ofa Doomed Mamage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 844-45 (1977).
189. MINN. STAT. § 609.075 (1980) provides:
An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal
by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a neces-
sary element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of intoxication may be
taken into consideration in determining such intent or state of mind.
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A series of Wisconsin cases had barred such testimony in the first
half of the bifurcated trial. 19° The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals declared that "[t]he exclusion of psychiatric evidence offered
to show that the petitioner lacked the capacity to form specific
intent to kill the two victims, is, by itself, constitutionally in-
firm."' 19 1 The Wisconsin Supreme Court obliged by overruling its
past decisions. 92 Other state courts have reached the same conclu-
sion.' 93 Minnesota should recognize the constitutional inevitabil-
ity of the concept of diminished capacity and draft legislation
which avoids the subjectivity of the California interpretation.
The framers of Minnesota's bifurcated trial procedure appar-
ently did not appreciate the problematic effect of diminished ca-
pacity. The purpose of the bifurcated trial is to exclude damaging
psychiatric testimony during the "guilt" phase of the trial. The
accused, however, might want the jury to hear psychiatric testi-
mony if it may lead to a lesser included suspended conviction.
During the second stage the defense will introduce similar psychi-
atric testimony to obtain a not guilty verdict. Not only is the testi-
mony redundant but it allows the defense two chances to avoid
responsibility on the same basis. Several state courts resolved this
problem by declaring the bifurcation procedure unconstitu-
tional. 194 Minnesota should abandon the bifurcated procedure
even if it retains the insanity defense.
195
190. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 159, 163-65, 227 N.W.2d 911, 913-14 (1975),
ove mled in part, Schimmel v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 287, 302, 267 N.W.2d 271, 278 (1978)
(psychiatric testimony going to defendant's mental capacity admissible in first phase of
bifurcated trial); see also Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir.) (exclusionary
rule held unconstitutional as applied to first degree murder prosecution to which defend-
ant has pleaded not guilty), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
191. Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir.), ceri. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801
(1978).
192. Schimmel v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 287, 302, 267 N.W.2d 271, 278 (1978), overmledin
part, Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 98-99, 294 N.W.2d 2, 14 (1980) (competent psychiatric
evidence relevant to defendant's mental state at time of crime is inadmissible).
193. See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 113, 471 P.2d 715, 725 (1970); State ex re.
Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789, 792-93 (Fla. 1978); Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 280
(Wyo. 1977). A 1940 decision to the contrary, Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463
(1946), probably does not survive In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See Comment, Mens
Rea and Insanity, 28 ME. L. REV. 500, 528 (1976). For an opposing view, see H. HUcKA-
BEE, LAWYERS, PSYCHIATRISTS AND CRIMINAL LAW 30-100 (1980). Huckabee, a federal
prosecutor, is so dismayed with the California interpretation of diminished capacity that
he argues for the retention of the insanity defense.
194. See State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 113, 471 P.2d 715, 725 (1970); Stateex ret. Boyd
v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789, 792-93 (Fla. 1978); Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 280 (Wyo.
1977).
195. See generally Louisell & Hazard, Insanio as a Defense.: The Bifircaled Trial, 49 CAuF.
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C. The Guily-But-Mentally-Ill Verdict
Minnesota should not follow the example of Michigan and the
other states that have enacted a guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict al-
ternative. Before enacting this verdict, Michigan, like most states,
provided for an automatic commitment for those found not guilty
by reason of insanity. Following prevailing constitutional stan-
dards,'9 the Michigan Supreme Court declared the procedure un-
constitutional in People v. McQuillan.197 The court required the
state to provide civil commitment hearings for all persons then
held by virtue of insanity acquittals. Apparently several of the
subsequently released acquittees committed serious, well-publi-
cized crimes. The legislature responded immediately by creating
the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict in 1975.198 Because a recipient
of that verdict is pronounced guilty of a crime, the court can order
confinement for at least the duration of the maximum term of the
offense of conviction. More recently, Indiana, 19 Illinois,20° Con-
necticut,201 Georgia,202 Kentucky,2 3 and New Mexico2 have en-
acted substantially similar legislation.
None of these states amended or altered the standard regarding
the not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict. Theoretically, the
number of offenders entitled to that verdict remains constant: the
offenders who receive the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict would
have been found guilty under previous law. Thus, the new verdict
utterly fails that purpose for which it was developed because it
does not affect defendants acquitted by reason of insanity.
The legislators of these seven states are presumably more astute
than to enact a law which completely fails of its purpose. Al-
though the new verdict does not change the standard for an in-
L. REV. 805 (1961); Comment, The Gradual Decay ofthe Bifurcated Trial System in California
and the Emergence of "Partial Insanity:. 1966," 3 CAL. W.L. REV. 149 (1967).
196. See Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
197. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
198. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 768.36 (1982). See Schwartz, Michgan's New Law on
Cn'minal Responsibility-Moving Backward Confidently, 54 MICH. ST. BJ. 847, 847-48 (1975).
199. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-5-2-3 (Burns 1981).
200. Act of Sept. 17, 1981, Pub. Act No. 82-553, 1981 Ill. Laws 2782 (codified at ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 6-2, -4, 113-5, 115-1, -4, -6, 1005-2-5, -6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982)).
201. Act of June 9, 1981, Pub. Act No. 81-301, § 1, 1981 Conn. Acts 437, 437 (to
amend CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West Supp. 1982)).
202. Act of July 1, 1982, 1982 Ga. Laws 1476, 1477 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
1503 (Harrison Cum. Supp. 1982)).
203. Act of Mar. 26, 1982, ch. 113, § 7, 1981 Ky. Acts 199, 201 (to be codified in Ky.
REV. STAT. ch. 504).
204. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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sanity acquittal, some of the recipients of the guilty-but-mentally-
ill verdict most likely would have been insanity acquittees without
the new verdict. Jurors in those seven states can reach the new
verdict as a compromise decision. They can choose to label the
offender guilty with the assurance that the verdict will work for his
own good; the qualification "but mentally ill" implies that treat-
ment will follow. Indiana jurors are not aware that after a finding
of guilty-but-mentally-ill the "court shall sentence him in the same
manner as a defendant found guilty of the offense. '205 Michigan
and Illinois have substantially the same provision, 20 while the
Kentucky and New Mexico statutes do not even address the issue
of informing the jury of the consequences of the verdict. 20 7 At
least in Connecticut and Georgia, unless the defendant objects, the
jury shall be informed of the consequences of finding the defend-
ant guilty but not criminally responsible whenever the court in-
structs the jury on the insanity defense. 208 Connecticut, however,
provides that only if the defendant is found insane and dangerous
can he be confined for treatment up to the maximum sentence
which could have been imposed if he had been convicted of the
offense. 20 9 The mental evaluation which the statute requires the
court to order is nothing more than what any conscientious judge
would provide for a convicted person exhibiting a possible men-
tal disorder. Minnesota law contains virtually the same
requirement. 21
0
Thus, at best, the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict is misleading.
The "but-mentally-ill" portion of the verdict has no legal effect
other than to provide double stigmatization of the defendant: he's
not only guilty but crazy as well-both "bad and mad."' 21' The
verdict also misleads jurors into believing that they have accom-
plished something more than to decide guilt.
Adoption of the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict cannot avoid in-
creasing the cost and confusion in the administration of justice.
205. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-5-2-6 (Burns 1981).
206. Act of Sept. 17, 1981, Pub. Act No. 81-553, § 3, 1981 11. Laws 2782, 2878-88
(codified at ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, §§ 1005-2-5, -6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982)); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1982).
207. See Act of Mar. 26, 1982, ch. 113, 1981 Ky. Acts 199; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-
3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
208. Act of June 9, 1981, Pub. Act No. 81-301, § 2, 1981 Conn. Acts 437, 438; Act of
July 1, 1982, 1982 Ga. Laws 1476.
209. Act of June 9, 1981, Pub. Act No. 81-301, § 3, 1981 Conn. Acts 437, 440.
210. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01(2).
211. Schwartz, supra note 198.
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The judge would need to instruct the jury to distinguish between
the three verdicts. The defense would be entitled to an additional
instruction on the effect of mental illness on the issue of verdict:
1) not guilty (includes not guilty by reason of insanity), 2) guilty,
and 3) guilty but mentally ill. Few juries will be able to find their
way through this maze of instructions.
If the Minnesota legislature perceives a need to reform the in-
sanity defense, following the lead of Michigan would be counter-
productive. Reform is needed to protect society and the rights of
defendants, and to improve the administration of justice. The
guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict causes more harm that good to each
of these interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
The insanity defense is in trouble. Its overuse and abuse have
caused it to fall into disrepute. Mental health reforms have less-
ened the ability of the government to restrain insanity acquittees.
The defense causes unnecessary costs and stresses the criminal jus-
tice system.
Abolition of the defense sounds drastic. It is not. The require-
ment of proof of criminal intent and the companion doctrine of
diminished capacity would adequately divert mentally ill offend-
ers from criminal sanctions. Sentencing alternatives are sufficient-
ly flexible and mild to accommodate mentally ill offenders without
offending principles of fairness. In fact, abolition enhances fairness
by eliminating the obvious advantages available only to intelligent
and affluent defendants.
The volume of the debate and comment concerning the insanity
defense attests to the need for reform. None of the many reforms
adopted has provided a satisfactory result. The defense is too in-
firm to be cured. The insanity defense should be abolished.
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